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Previous empirical studies of information cascades use either naturally occurring data or laboratory
experiments with student subjects.  We combine attractive elements from each of these lines of research
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quality of previous public signals, as well as decision heuristics that differ from Bayesian rationality.
Analysis of over 1,500 individual decisions suggests that CBOT professionals are better able to discern
the quality of public signals than their student counterparts.  This leads to much different cascade formation.
Further, while the behavior of students is consistent with the notion that losses loom larger than gains,
market professionals are unaffected by the domain of earnings.  These results are important in both
a positive and normative sense.
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In economic and financial environments in which decision makers have imperfect 
information about the true state of the world, it can be rational to ignore one’s own 
private information and make decisions based upon what are believed to be more 
informative public signals.  In particular, if decisions are made sequentially and earlier 
decisions are public information, “information cascades” can result. Information cascades 
arise when individuals rationally choose identical actions despite having different private 
information.
1  Cascades may arise in myriad settings, including technology adoption, 
medical treatment, and environmental hazard response.  Arguably, however, the most 
well-known herds or cascades occur in financial markets, where bubbles and crashes may 
be examples of such behavior.
2  
Since the private information of cascade followers is not revealed, information 
cascades can be suboptimal.  Moreover, because the small amount of information 
revealed early in a sequence has a large impact on social welfare, cascades can be fragile, 
with abrupt shifts or reversals in direction when new information becomes available 
(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992, 1998; hereafter BHW), Gale (1996), 
Goeree et al. (2004)).  Indeed, some argue that the volatility induced by herding behavior 
can increase the fragility of financial markets and destabilize the broader market system 
(Eichengreen et al. (1998), Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), Chari and Kehoe (2004)). 
Previous empirical approaches that examine cascade behavior can be divided into 
two classes; regression-based tests that use naturally occurring data and laboratory 
experiments that use data gathered from student subjects.  In a review of the extant 
regression-based results for herding in financial markets, Bikhchandani and Sharma 
(2000) note the difficulty of controlling for underlying fundamentals, and argue that as a   2
result of this difficulty there is often “a lack of a direct link between the theoretical 
discussion of herding behavior and the empirical specifications used to test for herding.”
3  
The laboratory environment, in contrast, allows one to control for public and private 
information and thus to make explicit tests of theoretical predictions more easily.  Yet an 
important debate exists about the relevance of experimental findings from student 
subjects for understanding phenomena in the field.  For example, professional behavior in 
the field might differ from student behavior in laboratory experiments due to training or 
regulatory considerations, which may affect the development of decision heuristics, as 
well as the overall naturalness of the experimental environment (see, for example, 
Harrison and List (2004)).  Locke and Mann (2005) argue that financial market research 
that ignores the effect of professional expertise is likely to be received passively because 
“ordinary” individuals, as opposed to professional traders, are too far removed from the 
price discovery process.  Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000, p. 13) also argue that “to 
examine herd behavior, one needs to find a group of participants that trade actively and 
act similarly.”   
We find these arguments compelling and therefore combine the most attractive 
aspects of these two classes of empirical research, that is, we observe professionals in a 
controlled environment, and extend the literature in several new directions.  First, we 
compare the behavior of market professionals from the floor of the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) with that of college students in an experimental setting in which the 
underlying rationality of herd behavior can be identified.  Second, given the vast 
normative implications of work that has established the importance of the domain of 
earnings for decision making under risk (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Shefrin and   3
Statman (1985), Odean (1998)), we examine the behavior of each group in the gain and 
loss domain.  We further examine whether, and to what extent, cascade formation is 
influenced by both private signal strength and the quality of previous public signals, as 
well as decision heuristics that differ from Bayesian rationality.  Finally, within the group 
of market professionals, we examine the extent to which differences in cascade formation 
are associated with individual characteristics such as whether the participant is a day 
trader.  
Empirical findings gained from an examination of more than 1,500 individual 
decisions lend some interesting insights into cascade behavior.  A key finding is that 
market professionals tend to make use of their private signal to a greater degree and base 
their decisions on the quality of the public signal to a greater extent, than do students.  As 
a result, the professionals are involved in weakly fewer overall cascades and significantly 
fewer reverse cascades (cascades that lead to inferior outcomes).  This result is novel to 
the literature and has important implications for financial markets.
4  Further, while the 
behavior of students is consistent with the notion that losses loom larger than gains, 
market professionals are unaffected by the domain of earnings.  This finding is consistent 
with Locke and Mann (2005), Genesove and Mayer (2001), and List (2003, 2004), who 
find, in varying environments, that market experience is associated with a decline in 
deviations from classical assumptions.   
Note that we observe behavioral differences not only across subject pools, but 
also within the market professional group.  For example, Bayesian play is correlated with 
market experience and day traders are much more likely to join an informational cascade   4
than are non-day traders.  Finally, we present data on the prevalence of non-Bayesian 
decision heuristics, an area in which the two subject pools demonstrate similarities.   
The remainder of the study is crafted as follows.  Section II outlines the basic 
theory and experimental design.  Section III presents our empirical results.  Section IV 
considers implications of our results for financial markets and briefly discusses the use of 
professionals in experimental practice more broadly.  Section V concludes.   
I.  Theory and Experimental Design 
Imitative behavior associated with herding has often been viewed as the product 
of irrational decision-making (Keynes (1936); Shleifer and Summers (1990); Hirshleifer 
(2001)).  Alternatively, models such as Banerjee (1992), BHW (1992), and Welch (1992) 
consider the conditions under which it is rational to join a cascade.  The model we 
present below, and the experimental environment we implement, is consistent with the 
work of this second set of authors in that it is predicated on Bayesian updating of beliefs, 
given private signals and a history of observable actions.
5  The empirical investigation of 
the cascade phenomenon raises interesting questions beyond whether agents update 
information in a manner that is consistent with Bayes’ rule.
6  Since the formation of 
informational cascades is a social phenomenon, individual behavior may depend on how 
agents view the rationality of others.  Accordingly, we examine how our two subject 
pools respond to uncertainty about the quality of information that arises due to potential 
deviations from Bayesian rationality by others.  We adopt two approaches.  First, we use 
a model in which the null hypothesis is that Bayesian rationality is universally applied 
and is common knowledge.  Second, we estimate a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) 
model that assumes decision error (McKelvey and Palfrey (1998), Goeree et al. (2004a).   5
A. Theoretical Model and Predictions 
Consider an environment in which there are two possible underlying states of 
nature  {} B A, = Ω , with the true state denoted by  Ω ∈ ω .  Each of a set of  {} n I ,.., 2 , 1 =  
agents receives an independent private signal,  { } b a si , ∈ , that is informative in the sense 
that  ) | Pr( ) | Pr( a B a A >  and  ) | Pr( ) | Pr( b B b A < .  Signal precision, given by 
) | Pr( ω ω = s , is identical for all agents. After receiving their signal, each agent chooses 
either A or B with their choice,  i c .  If  ω = i c , individual i receives a reward normalized to 
one. , If  ω ≠ i c , individual i receives zero. Each individual receives their signal in an 
exogenously determined choice order.  Along with their private signal  i s , each agent 
observes the history of choices,  { } 1 1,..., − = i i c c H .  The prior probability of an underlying 
state, given by  p A = = ) Pr(ω  and  p B − = = 1 ) Pr(ω , is common knowledge.  If all 
individuals update beliefs according to Bayes’ rule and this updating is common 
knowledge, the posterior probability  ) , | Pr( i i s H ω is easily derived.  We demonstrate the 
formation of an information cascade in this setting via a simple example, parameterized 
with the probabilities from one of our experimental treatments.  
Let  2 / 1 ) Pr( ) Pr( = = = = = p B A ω ω  be the prior probability, with the precision 
of the symmetric signal given by  3 / 2 ) | Pr( ) | Pr( = = B b A a , with complementary 
probabilities   3 / 1 ) | Pr( ) | Pr( = = B a A b .  Suppose that  a s = 1 .  Bayes’ rule implies that  
                        
3
2
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) Pr( ) | Pr(
) | Pr( 1 =
+
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B B a A A a
A A a
a s A ω .   (1)   6
An expected utility maximizer would therefore predict A as the state of nature since 
expected profits for announcing A,  A π , exceed those for announcing B,  B π .
7  If the 
second subject also receives an a signal, updating according to Bayes’ rule yields  
5
4
) | Pr( ) | Pr(
) | Pr(
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B a A a
A a
a s A H A ω .                          (2) 
That is, two consecutive identical announcements yield a posterior probability of 0.80 in 
favor of the indicated urn.
8  As a result, the third decision maker should “follow the herd” 
and choose  A = ω  regardless of her signal, as can be seen by examining the posterior in 





) | Pr( ) | Pr( ) | Pr( ) | Pr(
) | Pr( ) | Pr(




= = = =
B b B a A b A a
A b A a
b s A A H A ω .     (3) 
We classify a decision of this type—consistent with Bayesian rationality, but 
inconsistent with one’s own private signal—as a cascade decision.  In this example, the 
decision maker in the third position reveals nothing about their private information and 
thus the positive externality associated with learning from other’s choices is blocked by a 
cascade.  The analysis implies that, with this parameterization, public announcements are 
uninformative whenever the number of public signals of one type exceeds the other by 
two or more.  As a result, if a cascade has not started, two consecutive low probability 
draws can result in a reverse cascade whereby everyone rationally herds on the incorrect 
state.  
B. Experimental Design  
Anderson and Holt (1997) present a seminal experimental investigation of 
cascade formation using a subject pool of undergraduates.  To ensure comparability of   7
our results to the extant literature, we use experimental protocols that are closely related 
to those of their work.
9  The parameterization in the example above is consistent with 
their symmetric treatment () . ) | Pr( ) | Pr( B b A a =  The experimental sessions we conduct 
comprise 15 rounds of the basic game for a group of either five or six players whose 
choice order in each round — either first, second, third, …., sixth ― is determined by a 
random draw.   
A round begins with the experimental monitor selecting the state of nature with a 
roll of a die that is unobserved by the subjects. Subjects gain information about the state 
by drawing a single ball out of an unmarked bag into which the contents of the selected 
urn have been transferred. The draw is made while the subject is isolated from the other 
players. The monitor is informed of the choice of the state, and announces it publicly. 
After all subjects have made their choices, the true state is revealed.  
To provide exogenous variation in the informational content of the private signal 
across treatments, we use two urn types.  In the symmetric treatment, Urn A contains two 
type-a balls and one type-b ball, while Urn B contains two type-b balls and one type-a 
ball.  To create the asymmetric treatment, we add four a balls to both urns, yielding 6 (5) 
a signals and 1 (2) b signal in the A (B) state.  This modification results in a significant 
dilution of the strength of an a signal, the relative weakness of which can be observed in 
Table I, which provides posterior probabilities for all possible signal histories for both the 
symmetric and asymmetric urn types.  As an example, the two-thirds probability that 
arises after a single a draw in the symmetric treatment arises after four consecutive a 
draws in the asymmetric setting.   One consequence of the change in signal strength is   8
that in the asymmetric treatment, a cascade on the B state should take place after one b 
signal even with either one or two a signals in the game’s history.   
The difference in signal strength across urn types allows us to investigate the 
relationship between Bayesian updating and a choice heuristic based on a counting rule.  
In the symmetric treatment, the optimal decision is always consistent with choosing the 
state with the most informative signals.  In the asymmetric case, four sequences violate 
this counting rule in that it is optimal to choose B even when there are fewer b signals;  
these  noncounting rule sequences are  { } ) 2 , 4 ( ), 2 , 3 ( ), 1 , 3 ( ), 1 , 2 ( ) , ( ∈ b a , as indicated by 
bold type in Table I. Thus, the asymmetric treatment allows us to gain insights into the 
extent to which decisions are better characterized as following a counting heuristic rather 
than Bayesian updating.  
To provide exogenous variation in the earnings domain, we randomly place 
subjects in either a gain or a loss treatment for all 15 rounds.  The treatment is 
implemented so that in gain (loss) space a correct (incorrect) inference about the 
underlying state results in positive (negative) earnings of $1 for students and $4 for   
market professionals.
10  An incorrect (correct) choice in gain (loss) space results in no 
earnings.  To generate similar monetary outcomes across treatments, in the loss 
treatments, students and market professionals are, endowed with $6.25 and $25.00, 
respectively.
11  We believe that this is the first study to vary the gain/loss domain in 
cascade games. 
Experimental subjects in a particular session consist entirely of one of the two 
subject types, students or market professionals.  The experimental sessions with market 
professionals are conducted at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the student data   9
are gathered from undergraduates at the University of Maryland in College Park.  The 
CBOT (student) subject pool includes 55 (54) subjects recruited from the floor of CBOT 
(the university).  The resulting experimental design is a 2x2x2 factorial across urn type 
(symmetric (S) or asymmetric (A)), domain type (gains (G) or losses (L)), and subject 
type (college undergraduates (C) or market professionals (M)).  Each experimental 
session consists of a group of either five or six participants making decisions within the 
same treatment type over 15 rounds.  Table II summarizes our experimental sessions.  
II.  Experimental Results 
Table III, Panel A presents descriptive statistics from the experiment.  We report 
the rate of Bayesian decision making and the rate of cascade formation, with a Bayesian 
decision defined assuming common knowledge of Bayesian rationality (no decision 
error).  Pooled, the 20 experimental sessions yield a total of 1,647 decisions, 1,284 (78%) 
of which are consistent with a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
12  Cascade decisions (i.e., 
Bayesian decisions inconsistent with the private signal) occur in 15% of the choices.  Of 
these, just under one-quarter (55 out of 245) are “reverse” cascades, resulting in the 
wrong inference about the underlying state.   
Perhaps more revealing than the aggregate number of cascades is the proportion 
of cascade decisions made when the opportunity arises.  Recall that a cascade decision is 
possible only when the private draw is inconsistent with the probability weight derived 
from the choice history and one’s own private signal.  In our data, cascade formation is 
possible in 441 of the decisions, representing 27% of the total; cascades are realized in 
245 (56%) of these cases.  These results are presented in the potential and realized 
cascades columns of Table III, Panel A.     10
Table III, Panel A also reports statistics disaggregated by subject and treatment 
type.  In aggregate, 81% (75%) of the students’ (market professionals’) decisions are 
consistent with Bayesian Nash equilibrium.  Decisions of individual subjects range from 
38% to 100% Bayesian (these results are not shown to conserve space), and of the 14 
subjects perfectly consistent with Bayesian rationality, 10 were students.
13  In situations 
in which Bayesian behavior requires that one ignore private information, fewer agents are 
Bayesian: The final column of Table III, Panel A shows that 61% (49%) of students 
(market professionals) ignore their signal when doing so leads to a cascade.   
Interestingly, rates of cascade formation and Bayesian decision making are lower in the 
asymmetric treatments for both subject pools.   
The final set of descriptive statistics is presented in Table III, Panel B, which 
displays results from the asymmetric treatments first pooled and then parsed by subject 
pool and sequence type, where the type is either a counting rule or a noncounting rule 
sequence.
14  Table III, Panel B demonstrates that both Bayesian decision making and 
cascade formation decline when the rules are not reinforcing:  The proportion of 
Bayesian decisions by students (market professionals) declines from 76% (76%) to 49% 
(42%), and the rate at which cascades obtain declines from 58 percent (55%) to 39% 
(26%).  These results suggest that the noncounting rule sequences pose a challenge for 
both subject pools.
15   
To permit more formal inference, we apply a variety of parametric and non-
parametric statistical techniques and group our results into five categories.  Three of the 
categories compare students and market professionals to consider differences in (1) 
Bayesian decision making, (2) cascade formation, and (3) behavior across the gain/loss   11
domain.  A fourth category concentrates on data from market professionals by making 
use of additional demographic data collected during the experiment.  The fifth category 
considers the exogenous alteration of signal strength through the use of the symmetric 
and asymmetric urns.  Our analysis leads to the following insight: 
RESULT 1:  Market professionals are less Bayesian than students.  Despite 
this behavioral discrepancy, earnings are not significantly different across 
subject pools. 
 
To provide evidence of this result we employ both unconditional and conditional 
statistical tests.  When using unconditional tests, we account for the data dependencies 
within an experimental session by using session-level aggregates to yield the most 
conservative statistical tests.  Our unconditional test used to support Result 1 is a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U test, which indicates that the rate of Bayesian decision 
making differs across subject pools at a level of significance of p = 0.052.
16   
To complement this analysis, we employ conditional tests that recognize the panel 
nature of our data; in particular, we use a random effects probit specification of the form 
                              Bayeit = β`Xit + eit,   eit ~N[0,1],               (4) 
where Bayeit equals unity if agent i is a Bayesian in round t under the assumption of no 
decision error by preceding players, and zero otherwise, and Xit includes treatment effects 
(gain, sym, and trader) and other variables predicted to influence play (order_x, diff, and 
heurist).  The treatment variables are as defined above: gain equals one (zero) for 
sessions in the domain of gains (losses), sym equals one (zero) for the symmetric 
(asymmetric) sessions, and trader equals one (zero) for the market professionals 
(students).     12
The remaining variables are defined as follows.  The categorical variable order_x 
(x=2,..,6) indicates the positional order in which the individual choice is made.  The 
posterior probability is incorporated in the variable diff,  which  is calculated as 
() 5 . 0 , | Pr − = s H A ω  and measures the accrued public and private information at the 
disposal of each decision maker; note that diff, therefore, varies from zero to one-half, 
increasing with evidence of the underlying state.
17  The variable heurist is equal to one 
(zero) for noncounting rule (counting rule) sequences.  In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 
the coefficients of these latter two variables should not differ from zero.   
We specify eit = uit + αi, where the two components are independent and normally 
distributed with mean zero: Var(eit) = σu
2 + σα
2.  We estimate equation (1) using the 
maximum likelihood approach derived in Butler and Moffitt (1982).  Estimation of this 
model is amenable to Hermite integration.  To estimate the model, we use a 12 point 
quadrature and the method of Berndt et al. (1974) to compute the covariance matrix. 
Empirical results are reported in Table IV, which presents the marginal effects 
associated with a change in each of the regressors computed at the overall sample 
means.
18  Concerning subject pool effects, results from both a likelihood ratio test and the 
trader dummy variable in the pooled regression model (Panel 4a) support the non-
parametric finding that market professionals are less Bayesian than students.
19  T h e  
estimated marginal effect in the pooled model suggests that traders are 6% less likely to 
be Bayesian, and this effect is significant at the p < 0.05 level.   
Despite the noisier environment (fewer professionals are Bayesian), market 
professionals and students choose the correct underlying state at similar rates.  Indeed, 
using a Mann-Whitney U-test, we find that we cannot reject the homogenous null that   13
success rates are similar at conventional levels (p= 0.29), leading to the result that 
earnings are similar across the subject pools.  To dig a level deeper into this finding, we 
estimate a model similar in spirit to equation (1), but make the dependent variable win be 
dichotomous and equal to unity (zero) if the individual chooses correctly (incorrectly).  
We also include an additional independent variable, round, to identify learning during the 
course of the session;  round is a time trend and increases from 1 to 15 within a session.
20 
The empirical results summarized in Table V support the nonparametric finding 
concerning earnings and provide more formal evidence of the second half of Result 1.  In 
particular, the trader variable in Table V, Panel 5a is not significantly different from zero 
at conventional levels (p = 0.27).  This result suggests that traders and students choose 
the correct urn at similar rates.  The two groups differ in their temporal play, however, as 
evidenced by the significant (insignificant) and positive marginal effect of round for the 
traders (students), consistent with learning effects among traders.  
Besides providing empirical support for Result 1, the models in Tables IV and V 
reveal some of the important effects of the other independent variables.  For example, the 
diff and heurist coefficient estimates in the pooled model of Table IV indicate that a 
marginal change in the posterior probability has a large positive effect (66%), while 
decisions in the counting rule sequences are 23% less likely to be Bayesian than those in 
which counting and Bayesian posterior imply the same result.  Similar insights arise 
when we split the sample by subject type, as summarized in Panels 4b and 4c of Table 
IV.  In addition, the effect of diff is statistically significant for both subject pools in the 
Table V win models.     14
Interestingly, urn symmetry, as captured by the sym dummy variable, is not 
significant for the market professionals in either model, implying that, for the traders, the 
difference across urn types is captured by the counting rule distinction.  In contrast, the 
urn difference has a significant influence on students, who are much more likely to be 
Bayesians in the symmetric treatment (see Table IV, Panel 4b).   
A final important difference across subject pools is that the order_x variables 
indicate a decline in Bayesian behavior among market professionals who choose in the 
third through fifth positions.  The magnitude of the effect is rather large, having from 
one-third to two-thirds of the effect of the counting rule sequences as represented in the 
heurist variable (Table IV, Panel 4c).  In contrast, the students show no such effect.  The 
behavior reflected in this finding is consistent with the idea that the market professionals 
recognize that no new additional information is added by choices once a herd has been 
formed.  
Given the significance of the diff and heurist variables, we explore the individual 
data further in a QRE model, which examines the degree to which incentives affect error 
rates in decision making.  Following Anderson and Holt (1997), we focus on data from 
our symmetric sessions and make use of the QRE model developed by McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1995, 1998); (see also Goeree et al. (2004), Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005)).  
The QRE model assumes that the probability of choosing an urn is increasing in its 
expected value.  Given the positive and significant coefficient on the diff variable in 
Table IV, the usefulness of such a model for both the students and market professionals 
appears evident.  For parsimony, we reserve detailed discussion of the QRE model for the 
Appendix, However, we briefly describe the results below.     15
Table A1 in the Appendix reports estimates of the lambda parameter in the QRE 
model.  The lambda parameter indicates the extent to which noise affects decision 
outcomes; as  ∞ → λ , the choice converges to the Bayesian outcome; as  0 → λ , the 
decisions become purely random.  Significant differences in lambda across the subject 
pools are observed at choice orders one, two, and five as reflected in the p-values in 
column “p” of Table A1.  Particularly notable is the difference at choice order two, where 
the students exhibit few errors.  The differences in noise in the first two choice orders 
lead to quite different behaviors in choice order three, despite the fact that estimates of 
the lambda parameter are indistinguishable.  
The lambda estimates imply that the two subject pools have similar deviations 
from Bayesian rationality at choice order three.  Thus, the market professionals’ tendency 
to rely on their own signal due to errors in earlier rounds is as rational as the students’ 
decision to ignore theirs and join the cascade.  Table A2 clarifies the meaning of this 
result by examining in detail the impact of the noisy decision process on revealed public 
information and choice probabilities for the first three rounds of play.  For comparison, 
we present the posteriors and choice probabilities assuming a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, as well as the actual individual decisions.   
Consider the posterior probability for choice order three in Table A2, the first 
choice at which a cascade may form in the symmetric treatment, when the signal history 
is AAb (or BBa).  In this case, the posterior probability of urn A has dropped from 0.67 
for the most likely urn to 0.51 (0.59) for the market professionals (students).  Thus, while 
ignoring one’s private information is optimal for both groups, the noise in prior decisions 
dilutes the strength of the signals, with the market professionals facing essentially a   16
random choice.  The probability that urn A is chosen is 0.54 (0.83) for the market 
professionals (students).  The differences across the sequences in choice order three 
highlights the fact that noise in the decision-making process dilutes the value of the 
public signal. 
Despite the evidence from the QRE estimation of the noisier environment for the 
market professionals we find that the two groups do not differ significantly in their 
earnings,.  Further exploration into this observation leads to the following two results: 
RESULT 2a:  In aggregate, the rate of cascade formation is not significantly 
different for students and market professionals; however market professionals 
enter into fewer reverse cascades in the asymmetric treatments.   
 
RESULT 2b:  Market professionals are better able to discern the quality of 
the signal associated with other players’ announcements than are students. 
 
Evidence in favor of Results 2a and 2b follows from both nonparametric and parametric 
statistical tests.  Even though the rate at which cascades are realized is roughly 60% for 
the students and only 50% for the market professionals (see Table III, Panel A), using a 
Mann-Whitney test the homogeneous null cannot be rejected at conventional levels 
(Mann-Whitney p=0.33).   
While the rate of cascade formation indicates that there is only weak evidence that 
students enter into a greater number of cascades than do professionals, there are 
significant differences across subject pools in the rate of cascade formation in the 
asymmetric urn treatment.  Table III, Panel A reveals that in the asymmetric treatment 
only 12% (8 of 66) of the cascades entered by market professionals are reverse cascades.  
This is roughly half of the rate observed for students (25 of 99), a difference that is 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level using a Mann-Whitney test.   17
To complement these nonparametric insights, we estimate models similar to 
equation (1), but set the dependent variable equal to one when a cascade is formed and 
zero otherwise.  To conserve space, we do not formally tabulate these results since they 
reinforce the nonparametric insights gained above.  We find that in the model that pools 
the symmetric and asymmetric data cascade formation is similar across the students and 
market professionals.  When we focus, instead, on reverse cascades and use only the data 
from the asymmetric urn treatments, we find that students enter significantly more 
reverse cascades than do professionals.   
These results cannot be explained by our model of decision making based on 
posterior probabilities derived from signals and actions.  We therefore investigate the 
hypothesis that market professionals use auxiliary information that the students ignore in 
order to avoid reverse cascades.  To do so, we augment the cascade formation model 
discussed above by considering whether subjects use information specific to individuals 
selecting prior to them in the current round.   
Specifically, we construct two variables that each provides an indication of the 
Bayesian decision making of subjects who preceded each player in a particular round:   
othb_max (othb_min) measures the extent of previous Bayesian decisions by the most 
(least) Bayesian players.  For example, for player i whose choice order is x in round t, we 

































1 .                       (5) 
In this case, the proportion of Bayesian decisions for the individual with the lowest 
proportion among all j agents preceding the current decision maker is used as the   18
independent variable, although the empirical results are robust to other specifications 
including replacing the min operator with the mean or max.  In the case of othb_max, we 
simply replace “min” with “max” in equation (5).  Note that these variables are calculated 
for each t (round of the game) so that they include only those decisions that have already 
occurred.  The variables diff, heurist, and gain are also included, and are defined as in the 
previous models.  
Empirical results are presented in Table VI.  Since the results across models yield 
similar insights concerning the nature of interpreting signals, we focus on the othb_min 
results.  Although othb_min is insignificant in the pooled specification in Panel 6a, this 
result masks a difference in how the two subject pools respond to the announcements of 
others.  Results in Table VI, Panel 6c suggest that cascade formation for the market 
professionals is significantly and substantially associated with the quality of the others’ 
signals.  The marginal effect of a higher minimum in the preceding players’ share of 
Bayesian decisions is 47%, which is the largest of the variables that are statistically 
significant and is an indication of the impact of the inferred signal quality on the 
willingness to make a decision that relies on others.  This variable is significant and 
negative in the student sample (Panel 6b).   
Using othb_max in the regression yields an insignificant effect for the students, 
while the market professionals again respond positively, with a marginal effect of 57% 
(detailed results omitted).
21  We therefore conclude that the market professionals make 
better use of available public information, incorporating evidence on others’ rationality in 
their decision making in a way that is payoff relevant.
22  Note also that, in contrast with   19
what we found with respect to all decisions (Table IV), the diff variable is not significant 
for either group when we restrict our attention to the subset on cascade formation.  
One may wonder whether the result on signal quality is due to market 
professionals having a greater level of previous interaction with one another than 
students, or, alternatively, whether there is evidence of learning in the experiment.  To 
explore this issue, we again examine changes in behavioral patterns during an 
experimental session.  The evidence is consistent with the view that market professionals 
learn over these 15 rounds.  Comparing behavior from the first and last three rounds of a 
session, we find that market professionals: a) significantly reduce the rate at which they 
join reverse cascades (from 13% to 2%), and b) increase the rate at which they join 
cascades with good outcomes (from 24% to 46%).  Both results are statistically 
significant in probit specifications that include the cascade type as the dependent variable 
and the temporal variable along with the control variables as independent variables (full 
results omitted to conserve space).  By contrast, there are no significant changes in the 
rate of cascade formation for either type of cascade for the student subjects.   
Our final insight concerning the comparison between students and professionals 
concerns the domain of earnings of the game: 
RESULT 3:  Bayesian behavior of the student population is affected by whether 
earnings are in the gain or loss domain, while market professionals are unaffected.  
 
Summary evidence in favor of this result can be found in Table III, Panel A, where we 
observe that professionals exhibit a similar degree of Bayesian decision making across 
the gain and loss domains (roughly 75%), whereas for students Bayesian play increases in 
the loss domain.  For example, considering the asymmetric treatments, we find that a 
Mann-Whitney test indicates that college students are less Bayesian in the gain treatment   20
than in the loss treatment, while market professionals are unaffected by the domain of 
earnings (students:  p < 0.08; traders: p = 0.61).
23 
Empirical estimates in Table IV provide additional evidence of this result.  In the 
pooled data (Panel 4a), the dummy variable gain is not significant at conventional levels, 
and it remains insignificant for the market professionals’ specification (Panel 4c).  For the 
students, however, the parameter estimate is both significant (p=0.028) and negative, 
indicating a 6% increase in Bayesian behavior in the loss domain.  This result is 
consistent with the notion that, for the student population, losses loom larger than gains.  
This result is consonant with results in List (2003, 2004), who explore loss aversion in a 
much different environment.  Nevertheless, consistent with the notion that repetition 
might attenuate such anomalies (see, for example, Knez et al. (1985); Coursey et al. 
(1987)), analysis of the data from the student sessions provides some evidence that the 
effect of the domain is mitigated via repetition.   
While Results 1-3 highlight differences between the professional and student 
subjects, we also find important differences within the group of market professionals that 
are relevant for understanding their decision processes. We supplement our data with a 
survey implemented at the end of the experimental session. Upon exploring these data 
more closely, we find:    
RESULT 4:   Behavioral differences exist within the professional subject pool.    
Evidence of this result can be obtained by augmenting equation (1) using the additional 
demographic data collected from the CBOT floor personnel after the experiment.  We 
focus on data collected from a group of 28 of the 55 traders who reported information on 
intensity (the average number of contracts traded per day), gender (one for female, zero   21
otherwise), yrs (years of experience), income, and overnight, (a dichotomous variable that 
equals one if the trader takes overnight positions and zero otherwise).  Panel A. of Table 
VII reports on the Bayesian decision making and Panel B reports on the cascade 
formation for these traders.  
Concerning Bayesian decision making, we find that diff is not significantly 
different from zero.  Indifference to the magnitude of the posterior, for the Bayesian 
models, does not occur elsewhere in our study, and as we discuss previously is consistent 
with Bayesian rationality and inconsistent with theories of decision error.  Variables that 
are significant include heurist, intensity, and overnight.  As with the previous results 
reported in Table IV, heurist has a strong negative effect (-39.1%).  Trading intensity 
increases Bayesian behavior slightly (0.4%) and overnight trade has a significantly 
negative impact on the rate of Bayesian decision making (-17.8%). The probit estimates 
in Panel B reveal that day traders are much more likely to join an informational cascade, 
as are traders with lower trading intensity, with marginal effects of -80% on overnight 
and -2.9% on intensity. 
For those making consequential trading decisions, the link between trading 
intensity and Bayesian rationality is consistent with the empirical results of Locke and 
Mann (2005), Genovese and Mayer (2001), and List (2003, 2004), who find similar 
results in diverse settings that include financial, housing, and memorabilia markets.  We 
believe that the result on trading style is novel, and we offer some thoughts on its 
implications in the discussion section below.   
Results 1-4 highlight differences in cascade formation and Bayesian decision 
making across subject types, and include the exogenous alteration of signal strength due   22
to urn type through the heurist variable.  Our final result looks more closely at the impact 
of signal strength: 
RESULT 5: Deviations from Bayesian norms are greatest when the counting rule 
and Bayesian updating make different predictions.  
 
Our probit specifications reveal that when counting and Bayesian rationality yield 
different predictions, both market professionals and students are less Bayesian.  Table 
VIII presents all of the observed signal patterns for the asymmetric treatment.  Those in 
which the counting rule and Bayesian posteriors yield different predictions are in bold 
type.  Statistical tests confirm what a visual scan of the data suggests:  Bayesian behavior 
is significantly reduced in the noncounting rule sequences.
24  In fact, the four 
noncounting rule sequences have lower rates of Bayesian decision making than any of the 
other sequences, despite the fact that others have smaller diff values.   
Figure 1 illustrates this insight by presenting the proportion of Bayesian decisions 
for all observed histories of play as a function of the posterior probability.  The non-
counting rule sequences (square entries) are uniformly lower than the other choice 
histories, represented as black diamonds.  Compiling the results from Figure 1, we find 
that Bayesian behavior occurs at a rate of 44% in the non-counting rule choice histories 
and at a rate of 81% in the remaining choice histories in the asymmetric treatments.  
There is an important difference in the rate of Bayesian behavior in noncounting rule 
sequences that depends on whether one’s decision involves choosing to join a cascade.  
The difference is best explained by considering whether individuals rely on their private 
signal.  Restricting attention to noncounting rule sequences, we find that individuals are 
Bayesian in 31% of the cases when the decision involves choosing to enter a cascade.  
Therefore, 69% follow their own signal.  By contrast 74% of decisions are Bayesian   23
when there is no potential cascade and the decision is consistent with one’s private 
information (see Table IX).  Thus, when the signal history requires that Bayesian agents 
ignore their own signal, agents generally fail to do so.  As a result, the failure of cascade 
decisions implies that 69% rely on their own information – a result statistically 
indistinguishable from the 74% who rely on their own signal when doing so is optimal.  
We conclude that for the noncounting rule sequences, a Bayesian perspective provides a 
less accurate description of decision making than the simple rule of using private 
information.  
III. Discussion 
  Our cascade game data yield interesting evidence of heterogeneity both across the 
two subject pools and within the market professional group.  Simple measures of 
performance indicate that the students outperform the market professionals.  Controlling 
for learning about signal quality, however, makes clear that the market professionals use 
a more sophisticated decision process, more finely parsing the quality of public 
information and relying on their own signal more frequently.  Within the market 
professional group, trading style has a strong effect on behavior, with those taking 
overnight positions entering cascades much less frequently. 
We view these results as having potentially interesting implications for financial 
markets, although care must be taken with the interpretation, in part because of the fixed 
payoff that subjects received in our experiment.
25  However, fixed prices are not 
irrelevant in financial markets as variability in order size means that prices need not 
change with each transaction.  Thus, it is reasonable to study cascade decisions occurring 
at a constant price as well as those that lead to a change in price.    24
We believe it is plausible that the heterogeneity among traders regarding cascade 
formation may be related to differences in their trading practices, including those around 
fixed prices.  Local floor traders who do not take overnight positions typically specialize 
as market makers and are more likely to face situations in which herding, including 
herding at a constant price, is part of their trading practice.  This type of herding may 
occur, for example, when several floor traders each take a portion of a large institutional 
order.  Manaster and Mann (1999) provide evidence that market makers are willing to 
give up their advantage in executions, narrowing or eliminating the bid-ask spread, when 
they have an informational advantage over the outside order.  If information is dispersed 
among traders heterogeneously, the situation is similar to the cascade environment we  
study here.  A crucial difference is that timing and transaction size in the market is 
endogenous, and ultimately, of course, prices do change.
26    
Avery and Zemsky (1998) introduce flexible pricing into the BHW model and 
find that for cascades to form, the value uncertainty, which we implement in our 
experimental protocol, needs to be accompanied by event uncertainty (the possibility of a 
change in asset value) and composition uncertainty (which implies that the distribution of 
trader types is not common knowledge).  Our results on the discernment of the quality of 
public announcements suggest that experienced professionals are better able to estimate 
the composition of the distribution of trader types, and so may act to mitigate price 
bubbles and crashes.
27  Clearly, while additional research regarding the impact of trader 
specialization is warranted, our findings highlight the benefits of controlled 
experimentation with nonstudent subject pools.    25
We believe that our findings may also shed light on other types of cascade 
behavior.  Consider Welch’s (1992) interesting model of initial public offerings (IPOs), 
for example, which addresses cascade formation at a fixed price due to regulatory 
requirements for IPOs.  Welch finds that issuing firms have an interest in pricing to 
generate an informational cascade in order to increase the probability of a successful 
offering.  Our results that emphasize the potential for cascade fragility arising from 
variation in the ability to interpret signal quality may be important in this context.  One 
possible implication is that when underpricing of offerings is optimal in the Welch 
model, heterogeneity in signal strength and interpretation might play an instrumental role 
since reverse cascades in which no investment occurs will be fragile.  The welfare 
implications, however, are not immediately obvious given that the resulting cascades are 
of shorter duration.  Further, the importance of the effect may differ across firms or 
industries depending on the economies of scale of the investment and thus the need to 
have full or only partial subscription (Welch (1992), p. 709).   
Both the differences due to specialization and the heterogeneity in signal quality 
and processing abilities suggest fruitful directions for future research. How the 
specialized skills of market participants interact in price discovery could be explored in 
experiments that move towards a full market setting, but in which liquidity and 
informational conditions are varied in a controlled manner.  A natural part of this 
research program would be to extend the current environment to study the impact of 
heterogeneity on the IPO model of Welch (1992).  In a recent study that provides 
evidence from asset market experiments with student subjects Dufwenberg, Lundqvist, 
and Moore (2005) find that mixed experience levels can reduce the incidence of bubbles   26
and crashes.  Heterogeneous subject pools that include professionals would shed crucial 
light on this issue, and help to identify the mechanisms underlying cascade formation and 
fragility in settings that mix fixed and variable prices.  
IV.   Concluding Comments 
In this study, we introduce market professionals from the CBOT floor to a 
controlled experimental environment.  Making use of information cascades games, we 
report several insights.  While student subjects more closely follow Bayes’ rule, they do 
not perform significantly better than the market professionals along the important 
dimension of earnings.  This puzzle is explained by the fact that professionals are more 
sophisticated in their use of public information, as manifested over the course of the 
decision process:  Market professionals are less Bayesian when making decisions later in 
the choice order in a cascade game, consistent with recognizing that the quality of initial 
announcements is variable, altering the payoffs of joining cascades.  
While market professionals learn over the course of an experimental session to 
account for the quality of others’ decisions, student subjects fail to do so.  A further 
insight is that market professionals are consistent in behavior over the gain and loss 
domains, while in aggregate, students behavior is consistent with the notion of loss 
aversion.  Perhaps most provocatively for the operation of markets, we find an important 
heterogeneity among the market professionals that depends on their trading style.  In 
summary, our data reveal that the decisions of market professionals are consistent with 
behaviors that may mitigate informational externalities in market settings, and thus 
reduce the severity of price bubbles due to informational cascades.    27
Besides revealing both positive and normative insights, our work also offers a 
methodological contribution.  For example, it highlights the potential for experiments 
with students and professionals to be complementary inputs to research when field data is 
suggestive but inconclusive.  Indeed, in transferring the insights gained in the laboratory 
with student subjects to the field, a necessary first step is to explore how market 
professionals behave in strategically similar situations.  In this spirit, we focus on the 
representativeness of the sampled population to lend insights into which empirical results 
are similar across subject pools.  A related issue concerns the representativeness of the 
environment, which also merits serious consideration.  For example, before we can begin 
to make reasonable arguments that behavior observed in the lab is a good indicator of 
behavior in the field, we must explore whether the other dimensions of the laboratory 
environment might cause differences in behavior, including the abstract task, the stakes, 
the good, and the institution.  While our research represents a necessary first step in the 
discovery process, we hope that future efforts will explore more fully other potentially 
important dimensions of the controlled laboratory experiment.      28
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Appendix:  QRE Estimation Results 
Results in Table IV lead us to investigate a modification of the quantal response 
equilibrium (QRE) developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998).  By accounting for 
the noise associated with the probabilistic choice rule, the QRE yields alternative 
measures of the public belief.  Our approach invokes a rational expectations assumption 
for the error distribution.  There is mixed evidence for this assumption (see Goeree et al. 
(2004b) and Kubler and Weizsacker (2004a, 2004b)), but several alternative 
specifications yield similar insights (these results are available upon request).   
Let the probability of choosing urn A be given by 



















i i ε ε ε − = . For comparability across 
subject pools we normalize so that $W = 1 for both subject pools.  If the errors have an 
extreme value distribution, then the conditional probability of the urn choice is given by 
the logistic distribution yielding
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The lambda parameter indicates the extent to which noise affects decision outcomes.  As 
∞ → λ , the choice converges to the Bayesian outcome; as  0 → λ , the decisions become 
purely random.  Note that the posterior probability that the urn is A, 
A
i π , is a function of 
the  lambda estimates from previous choice orders, with ( )
1 ... 1 − i λ  representing the vector 
of previous estimates.   
In our estimation, we follow Anderson and Holt (1997) and focus on the 
symmetric data.  The QRE results using these data are displayed in Tables X and XI.  Our   36
results emphasize the fact that not only the numbers of each signal, but also the order in 
which they are revealed have an important impact on behavior.  For example, note the 
posterior probability for order choice three in Table X, the first choice where a cascade 
may form in the symmetric treatment, when the signal history is AAb (or BBa) (since the 
AAb and BBa are symmetric, Table X reports the results from these sequences as one 
choice history (AAb); all other symmetric choice sequences are treated similarly).  In this 
case the posterior probability of urn A has dropped from 0.67 for the most likely urn to 
0.51 (0.59) for the market professionals (students).  Thus, while ignoring one’s private 
information is optimal for both groups, the noise in prior decisions dilutes the strength of 
the signals, with the market professionals facing essentially a random choice with the 
probability that urn A is chosen being  0.539 (0.833) for the market professionals 
(students). In comparison the ABa sequence, which has an identical posterior probability 
when there is no noise, the posterior 0.64 (0.65) for market professionals (students), and 
the optimal decision is made uniformly by both subject pools. This difference across the 
sequences in choice order three highlights the fact that noise in the decision making 
process dilutes the value of the public signal. 
 
 Table I.  
Posterior Probabilities: Symmetric (upper) and Asymmetric (lower) Urns 
Entries represent the posterior probabilities for all possible sequences of draws for both symmetric (upper) and asymmetric (lower) 
treatments based on choice histories (a, b).  The prior probability of an urn is 0.5 in (0,0). Bold entries for the asymmetric urn are those 
in which counting and the posterior probability make different predictions about the state.  


































































Panel A (B) shows that Market Professionals (Students) are exposed to either the Symmetric or Asymmetric urn and play the game in 
either the gain or the loss domain.  The symmetric urn consists of three balls — two a and one b in Urn A, and one b and two a in Urn B.  
The Asymmetric urn consists of seven balls — six a and one b in Urn A, and five a and two b in Urn B.  The number of decisions is a 
function of the number of players, the number of games, and the number of rounds in each game.   
 
  Symmetric Urn  Asymmetric Urn 
  Gains Losses Gains Losses 
Panel A: Ten Market Professional Sessions 
Number  of  Sessions  3 1 3 3 
Participants in Session  5  5  One with 5, two with 6  6 
Total  Decisions  225 75 255  270 
Average Earnings   $43.20  -$20.80  $39.06  -$22.89 
Panel B: Ten Student Sessions 
Number  of  Sessions  3 1 3 3 
Participants in Session  One with 5, two with 6  5  One with 5, two with 6  5 
Total  Decisions  267 75 255  225 
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Table III.a. Disaggregated Decision Making across Treatments 








1.  Pooled Data 














2.  College Student Treatments (C) 
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3. Market Professional Treatments (M) 
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The Bayesian column represents the total number of decisions (and proportion) that were consistent with a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
Cascade decisions (those which are Bayesian but private information ignored) and reverse cascades (same as cascades but the wrong 
inference of the underlying state takes place) occupy the next two columns.  The potential cascades category represents the proportion 
(and number) of cascades that could have occurred when it was possible to make one, and the realized cascades category represents the 
proportion of those potential cascades that were actually realized. “n” = number of decisions. Treatment codes are S = symmetric, A = 
asymmetric, G = gain, L =  loss, C =  college student, M =  market professional.    
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Table III.b Decision Making by Counting Rule Predictions (Asymmetric Treatments) 
1. Pooled Data 
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2.College Student Treatments (C) 
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3. Market Professional Treatments (M) 
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Count = Baye 



























The Bayesian column represents the total number of decisions (and proportion) that were consistent with Bayesian updating.  Cascade 
decisions (those which are Bayesian but private information ignored) and reverse cascades (same as cascades but the wrong inference of 
the underlying state takes place) occupy the next two columns.  The potential cascades category represents the proportion (and number) of 
cascades that could have occurred when it was possible to make one, and the realized cascades category represents the proportion of those 
potential cascades that were actually realized. “n” = number of decisions. Treatment codes are S = symmetric, A = asymmetric, G = gain, 
L =  loss, C =  college student, M =  market professional.   
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4a: Pooled Model (combining market 
professionals and students) 
n = 1647 
Pr(Baye=1)=.818 
4b. Student Model 
n = 822 
 
Pr(Baye=1)=.868 
4c. Market Professionals Model 







z stat  P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z| 
Diff  0.655 5.53 0.000  0.769 5.06 0.000  0.546 3.11 0.002 
Heurist -0.232 -4.95 0.000  -0.161 -2.51 0.012  -0.284 -4.47 0.000 
Gain  -0.030 -1.13 0.259  -0.060 -2.19 0.028 0.015 0.34 0.737 
Sym  0.102 3.64 0.000  0.145 4.88 0.000  0.037 0.79 0.430 
Trader  -0.060  -2.32  0.020  - - - - - - 
order_2 -0.023 -0.66 0.507 0.019 0.54 0.590  -0.084 -1.42 0.157 
order_3 -0.041 -1.06 0.291 0.017 0.42 0.673  -0.120 -1.86 0.063 
order_4 -0.120 -2.91 0.004  -0.052 -1.13 0.261  -0.205 -3.12 0.002 
order_5 -0.035 -0.95 0.343 0.017 0.46 0.649  -0.107 -1.71 0.087 
order_6 -0.040 -0.83 0.408  -0.035 -0.56 0.577  -0.080 -1.05 0.294 
  Log Likelihood: -766.487, Wald 
2
(10) χ   
=   141.03, Prob > 
2
(10) χ  =    0.000 
Log Likelihood: -328.95, Wald 
2
(10) χ   
=   87.77, Prob >
2
) 9 ( χ  =    0.000 
Log Likelihood: -427.283, Wald 
2
(10) χ   
=  68.91, Prob > 
2
) 9 ( χ  =    0.000 
The dichotomous dependent variable in all three probit models (pooled, student, and market professional) is coded one for a decision consistent 
with the Bayesian posterior and zero otherwise.  Independent variables include diff, which is  ( ) 5 . − = A urn prob , where the  ( ) A urn prob =  is 
the posterior probability arising from the combination of public and private information at the disposal of each decision maker.  The variables 
gain, sym, and trader (in the case of the pooled model) are dichotomous and distinguish the treatments. Heurist is a dummy variable equal to one 
for the non-counting rule sequences and zero for all others. order_x (where x=2,..6) is a categorical variable indicating where in the round of play 
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Table V.  Winning Decisions: Probit Model  
Dependent 
variable:   
win 
5a: Pooled Model (combining market 
professionals and students) 
n = 1647 
Pr(Win=1)=.702 
5b. Student Model 
n = 822 
 
Pr(Win=1)=.729 
5c. Market Professionals Model 







z stat  P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z| 
Diff  1.070 7.85 0.000  1.039 5.51 0.000  1.053 5.55 0.000 
Heurist -0.008 -0.19 0.846  -0.009 -0.14 0.886  -0.050 -0.31 0.754 
Gain  0.083 2.65 0.008  0.113 2.52 0.012  0.158 1.26 0.207 
Sym  -0.028 -0.81 0.418  -0.013 -0.31 0.759  -0.122 -0.86 0.388 
Trader  -0.033  -1.10  0.272  - - - - - - 
Round  0.005 1.95 0.051  0.003 0.68 0.499  0.022 2.06 0.040 
order_2 0.008 0.22 0.824  0.014 0.29 0.774  0.008 0.05 0.960 
order_3 0.019 0.49 0.627  0.016 0.30 0.767  0.073 0.45 0.656 
order_4 0.048 1.26 0.206  -0.001  -0.02 0.988  0.293 1.79 0.074 
order_5 0.057 1.53 0.126  0.081 1.64 0.102  0.010 0.62 0.534 
order_6 0.063 1.33 0.184  0.046 0.63 0.528  0.192 0.96 0.337 
  Log Likelihood: -964.06, Wald  ()
2
11 χ   
=   99.52, Prob >  ()
2
11 χ  =    0.000 
Log Likelihood: -462.25, Wald 
2
(10) χ   
=   54.39, Prob > 
2
(10) χ  =    0.000 
Log Likelihood: -498.55, Wald 
2
(10) χ   
=  48.30, Prob > 
2
(10) χ  =    0.000 
The dichotomous dependent variable in all three probit models (pooled, student, and market professional) is coded one for a decision that correctly 
predicts the underlying state and zero otherwise.  Independent variables include diff, which is  ( ) 5 . − = A urn prob , where the  ( ) A urn prob =  is 
the posterior probability arising from the combination of public and private information at the disposal of each decision maker.  The variables 
gain, sym, and trader (in the case of the pooled model) are dichotomous and distinguish the treatments. Heurist is a dummy variable equal to one 
for the non-counting rule sequences and zero for all others. Round represents a time trend that increases from 1 to 16 with each completed play of 
the cascade game.  Order_x (where x=2,..6) is a categorical variable indicating where in the round of play the decision was made. The Wald 
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6a: Pooled Model (combining market 
professionals and students) 
n = 416 
Pr(Cascade=1)=.588 
6b. Student Model 
n = 226 
 
Pr(Cascade=1)=.676 
6c. Market Professionals Model 







z stat  P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z| 
Diff  0.861 0.75 0.453  -0.136  -0.08 0.939  1.689 1.13 0.259 
Othb_min  -0.014 -0.09 0.924  -0.572 -2.54 0.011 0.469 2.11 0.035 
Heurist -0.354 -4.35 0.000  -0.331 -2.49 0.013  -0.394 -3.95 0.000 
Gain  0.133 1.67 0.095  0.021 0.19 0.846  0.120 1.12 0.261 
Sym  0.126 1.03 0.303  0.389 4.09 0.000  -0.200  -1.16 0.246 
Trader  -0.111  -1.44  0.151  - - - - - - 
order_2 -0.146 -1.13 0.260 0.064 0.39 0.696  -0.332 -2.33 0.020 
order_3 0.078 0.72 0.469  0.167 1.24 0.214  0.039 0.24 0.810 
order_4 0.042 0.39 0.696  0.048 0.33 0.744  0.066 0.44 0.658 
order_5 0.233 2.35 0.019  0.169 1.21 0.225  0.308 2.13 0.033 
  Log Likelihood: -245.22, Wald   =  
2
) 10 ( χ  46.24, Prob > 
2
) 10 ( χ  =    0.000 
Log Likelihood: -125.20, Wald   = 
2
) 9 ( χ   27.78, Prob > 
2
) 9 ( χ  =    0.001 
Log Likelihood: -111.06, Wald   = 
2
) 9 ( χ  27.42, Prob > 
2
) 9 ( χ  =    0.0012 
The dichotomous dependent variable in all three probit models (pooled, student, and market professional) is coded one for a cascade decision 
and zero otherwise.  Independent variables include diff, which is  ( ) 5 . − = A urn prob , where the  ( ) A urn prob =  is the posterior probability 
arising from the combination of public and private information at the disposal of each decision maker.  The variables gain and trader (in the case 
of the pooled model) are dichotomous and distinguish the treatment/subject type.  Othb_min is the proportion of Bayesian decisions by the 
individual with the lowest proportion among all preceding the decision maker. The othb_min is calculated in each round of the game to include 
only those decisions that have already occurred. Heurist is a dummy variable equal to one for the non-counting rule sequences and zero for all 
others.  Order_x  is a categorical variable indicating where in the round of play the decision was made.  Note: Because the othbys variable is not 
applicable for those in the first round or first in choice order in subsequent rounds (they do not observe others’ decisions in the current round), 
these observations are excluded. This results in the exclusion of 25 of the 441 potential cascades. The order_2 dummy variable is also excluded 
and choice order two serves as the baseline to which others are compared. The Wald statistic tests the null hypothesis that all coefficients are 
zero.  
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Table VII. Bayesian and Cascade Behavior of Traders 
  7a: Trader subset of CBOT Market Professionals 
n = 227 
Dependent Variable: Baye 
Pr(Baye=1)=.745 
7b.Trader subset of CBOT Market Professionals 
n = 66 
Dependent Variable: Casc 
Pr(Casc=1)=.388 
Ind. Variables:   Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z|  Marginal 
Effect 
z stat  P>|z| 
Diff  0.467 1.34 0.181 3.710 0.65 0.517 
Heurist -0.391  -3.05  0.002  0.001  0.05  0.997 
Gain   -0.023  -0.24  0.81  0.163  0.59  0.552 
Sym  0.009 0.08 0.938 0.498 0.79 0.432 
order_2 0.061  0.64  0.523  n/a  n/a  n/a 
order_3  -0.029 -0.28 0.778 -0.185 -0.48 0.629 
order_4  -0.095 -0.86 0.392 -0.219 -0.68 0.498 
order_5 -0.024  -0.22  0.828  0.474  1.22  0.221 
order_6  0.089 0.67 0.504 0.229 0.36 0.721 
Intensity 0.004  2.44  0.015  -0.029  -1.91  0.056 
Gender 0.069  0.58  0.561  -0.955  -0.2  0.838 
Experience (yrs)  -0.001  -0.18  0.859  0.011  0.34  0.735 
Income  0.013 0.55 0.582 0.394 1.58 0.115 
Overnight  -0.173 -2.03 0.042 -0.804 -2.24 0.025 
  Log Likelihood: -93.93, Wald  ()
2
14 χ   =   52.74, Prob 
>   ()
2
14 χ  =    0.0000, Pseudo R-squared = 0.22 
Log Likelihood: -15.62, Wald   ()
2
13 χ   =   34.20, Prob 
>   ()
2
13 χ  =    0.0011, Pseudo R-squred = .52 
The dichotomous dependent variable in panel a. is coded one for a decision consistent with the Bayesian posterior and zero otherwise. For 
panel b. cascade formation is indicated by a one and cascade failure by a zero. Independent variables include diff, which is 
() 5 . − = A urn prob , where the  ( ) A urn prob =  is the posterior probability arising from the combination of public and private 
information at the disposal of each decision maker.  The variables gain and sym are dichotomous and distinguish the treatments. Heurist is 
a dummy variable equal to one for the non-counting rule sequences and zero for all others.  Order_x (where x=2,..6) is a categorical 
variable indicating where in the round of play the decision was made.  Intensity reflects the level of trading intensity among participants, 
measured as the number of contracts traded per day. Gender is 1 for female and zero for male. Experience (years) and income (dollars) and 
overnight (one for holding overnight positions, zero for daytrader) are additional control variables.  
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Table VIII.  Posterior Probability Urn is A and Proportion of Bayesian Decisions (Counting Rule Sequences in Bold) 
a                b  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
























































     
6 0.75 
0.80 
      
The number of A and B signals are given in the first row and first column, respectively.  The pairs of numbers within an (a,b) pair represent the 
Bayesian posterior (upper number) and the proportion of Bayesian decisions (lower number and in italics). Those in bold type are the counting 
heuristic sequences.  Thus (2,1) has a posterior probability of 42% that the urn is A (diff=0.08). Forty-six percent made the Bayesian decision in this 
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Table IX.  Bayesian Behavior and Potential Cascade: By Counting Rule Sequences  




































The proportion of Bayesian decisions both when a cascade is possible and when one is not for both counting rule  
and non-counting rule sequences in the asymmetric treatments are provided in the table.  When there is no  
potential cascade the proportion of Bayesian decisions (.74) is the proportion in which one follows the private  
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Table X. Lambda estimate for Quantal Response Equilibrium, Symmetric Gain treatment.  
Choice Order 
 
M C  p 
1  4.59 7.12 0.094
2  4.56 27.75 0.012
3  8.67 8.62 0.505
4  3.90 4.99 0.258
5  2.48 6.34 0.026
Columns M and C report the lambda parameter for market professionals and college students. Column p reports the one-tailed p-value for 
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Table XI. Posterior Probabilities and Choice Probabilities with QRE Decision Error for Both Market Professionals (M) 
and College Students (C) 
Choice Probability 
) , , | ( λ s H A c pr =  
Posterior Probability 








& Signal  
Bayes QRE Bayes QRE  A  B  Proportion 
A 
A B Proportion 
A 
1  A  1.00 0.82 0.92 0.67 0.67 0.67  37  8  0.822  43  4  0.915 
2  Aa  1.00 0.91 0.99 0.80 0.76 0.78  23  3  0.885  27  0  1.000 
2  Ab  0.50 0.36 0.15 0.50 0.44 0.47  4  15  0.211  3  17  0.150 
3  AAa  1.00 0.99 0.99 0.89 0.81 0.85  14  0  1.000  17  1  0.944 
3  AAb  1.00 0.54 0.83 0.67 0.51 0.59  7  6  0.538  12  0  1.000 
3  ABa  1.00 0.939  0.92 0.67 0.65 0.64  10  0  1.000  8  0  1.000 
3  ABb  0.00 0.049  0.03 0.33 0.32 0.31  1  7  0.125  0  9  0.000 
Calculations are for the first three choices of the symmetric gain treatment for market professionals (M) and college students (C), with the 
choice probability and the posterior probability adjusted for decision error.  For comparison, the probabilities assuming a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (Bayes) and the actual decisions are also presented.  Due to the symmetry of the treatment, the history and signal combination 
also represents its complement. For example the row reporting history and signal “ABa” also includes the “BAb” sequences.  
                                                           
1 Herding is a more general phenomenon than an informational cascade though both result in 
behavioral conformity.  The homogeneity of a herd may arise through other than informational 
means such as payoff externalities, preferences for conformity, or sanctions.  A comprehensive 
taxonomy of herd behavior is developed by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Smith and Sorenson 
(2000). Devenow and Welch (1996) and Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) also discuss 
alternative sources of herd behavior and review the extant literature. 
2 It has been argued, also, that information cascades can explain a large variety of social 
behaviors such as fashion, customs, and rapid changes in political organization.  Anderson 
(1994), Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992, 1998), and Welch (1992) 
discuss a variety of interesting examples.  A number of historical anecdotes can be found in 
MacKay (1980) and Garber (2000). 
3 Fama (1998) discusses the interpretation of empirical results as evidence of irrational behavior. 
4 Combined with the insights gained from the models of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrhamanyam (2001), and from Hirshleifer (2001), our results indicate 
that the ability of the strength and weight of the evidence to have a differential impact on asset 
pricing is a potentially powerful phenomenon.   
5 As we discus below, our experimental environment makes use of a binary signal, binary state, 
and fixed payoff regardless of the history of announcements. Avery and Zemsky (1998), Lee 
(1998), Chari and Kehoe (2004), and Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) explore more general settings 
in which variable pricing reduces but does not eliminate the potential for information cascades. 
Chamley (2004) provides a comprehensive review of rational herding models.       
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6 The ability of humans to reason in a Bayesian manner seems to depend on how information is 
presented. Studies that present base rates as percentages often show that we are poor “intuitive 
statisticians” (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)).  Decisions tend to be more consistent with 
Bayesian rationality when individuals experience probability distributions through repeated 
exposure (see Gigerenzer and Murray (1987)).  Our experiment is consistent with protocols that 
have been shown to give Bayesian decision making its best chance.   
7 In the gain treatments, 
3
$W
B A = −π π  after an initial a signal, where $W is the win amount.  
Treatments over gains and losses yield identical predictions (i.e., expected losses are minimized 
by picking the most probable urn). 
8 A second A announcement could arise in this setting if the second subject receives a b signal. 
We consider an announcement of A given the history Ab to be inconsistent with Bayesian 
rationality, although alternative interpretations are possible.  Since the posterior probability is 0.5 
in this case, a tie-breaking rule must be invoked. We follow Anderson and Holt (1997) in 
assuming that individuals who are indifferent announce their own signal. This is sensible if 
individuals recognize the possibility of decision error in previous announcements.  Alternative 
tie-breaking rules include random choice as in BHW (1992) and a “nonconfident” rule in which 
one ignores one’s own information (Koessler and Zieglemeyer (2000)).  In our treatments the 
Anderson and Holt rule is followed 81% of the time, with most of the deviations occurring in the 
early rounds of play.      
9 Our experimental instructions are available upon request.  Note that Anderson and Holt (1997) 
find that cascades form in roughly 70 percent of the rounds in which they are possible.      
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Deviations from Bayesian cascade formation occur most often when a simple counting rule gives 
a different indication of the underlying state.  Extensions to the experimental literature introduce 
relevant complications to the cascade process that include costly information, endogenous 
sequencing of choice order, collective decision making, expanded signal spaces, and payoff 
externalities (Celen and Kariv (2004, 2005), Cipriani and Guarino (2005b); Drehmann, 
Oechssler, and Roider (2005), Huck and Oechssler (2000), Hung and Plott (2001), Kubler and 
Weizsacker (2004), Noth and Weber (2003), Sgroi (2003), Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1998)).   
10  CBOT officials suggest that designing a 30-minute game with an expected average payout of 
approximately $30 is more than a reasonable approximation of an average trader’s earnings for 
an equivalent amount of time on the floor. In our experiments the median earnings for the market 
professionals are slightly in excess of this amount and therefore likely to be salient.  
11 To ensure that subjects depart with positive money balances we have both subject pools 
participate in other unrelated games during the experimental session.   
12 In the discussion that follows we use the term “Bayesian decision” to mean that the decision is 
consistent with the predictions of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
13 Thirteen of the 14 who are perfectly consistent with Bayesian rationality are in the symmetric 
urn treatment. One market professional is perfectly Bayesian in the asymmetric setting. 
14 We will see below that there are differences between the symmetric and asymmetric 
treatments even after controlling for the counting rule sequences.  As a result, we do not pool the 
symmetric results in this table.   
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15 Anderson and Holt (1997) find that the rate of Bayesian behavior in the noncounting rule 
sequences is 50%, comparable to our student population rate of 49% and close to the pooled rate 
of 44%.  
16 There are 10 session-level observations for each subject pool as summarized in Table II. 
17 The posterior, and thus the diff variable, remains constant once a cascade has formed, unless a 
decision breaking the cascade is observed. 
18 The alternative approach of computing the marginal effects for each observation and taking the 
means yields very similar results. Results are also robust to the inclusion of a time trend for 
round or time dummies (categorical time dummy variables for each round of play).  We discuss 
our evidence of learning further, below.   
19 A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis of no differences across the subject pools at the p< 
0.01 level. 
20 We test several specifications of the model of Bayesian decision making for learning and find 
no such effect.  
21  We estimated six models that included variables designed to measure the quality of previous 
agent’s decision-making on cascade formation. In addition to the three that used other Bayes 
variables (othb_min, othb_max, and othb_mean) we considered whether individuals who had 
previously revealed their private signal were followed when cascades were possible. These 
other_reveal models also tested the min, max, and mean operators. In all six cases market 
professionals followed those with higher levels of reliability into cascades. Among the students, 
in five of six cases there was no significant effect of signal quality, with othb_min the sole 
exception as reported in Table VI, Panel 6b.    
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22 Support for the significant differences between subject pools found in the parametric results is 
also found in nonparametric (Mann-Whitney) tests. 
23 Due to the small number of sessions at the individual treatment level, p-values for the Mann-
Whitney test are reported for observations aggregated at the individual participant level.   
24 We use a Wilcoxon matched pairs test with the variable of interest equal to the proportion of 
Bayesian decisions aggregated at the session level. The diff variable for the counting rule 
sequences is in the range from 0.0 to 0.2, and all other sequences with diff variables in this range 
are included for the paired comparison. Using data from the 12 asymmetric sessions we find that 
the counting rule sequences reflect less Bayesian decision making despite roughly equivalent diff 
scores at p<.01.   
25 There is a long and important debate on the relevance of cascade models for financial markets 
(Vives (1996)).  Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that the introduction of variable prices to the 
BHW model can eliminate informational cascades (herding in their terminology) under certain 
conditions.  Lee (1998), Chari and Kehoe (2004) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005a) demonstrate 
the potential for informational cascades in the variable price setting by introducing transaction 
costs, endogenous timing, and preference heterogeneity. 
26 One mechanism through which cascades might arise is, in the jargon of the trading floor, when 
local traders “lean on” large orders by trying to enter the market on the same side and at the same 
price. Locals who trade alongside an institutional order accumulate a position knowing that they 
can transact with the institution and avoid a loss. The decision process associated with deciding 
to trade with the institution has the character of a fixed price cascade.  In the context of option 
markets Berkman (1996) discusses how market makers supply liquidity in the presence of large    
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fixed price orders.  Chamley and Gale (1994) introduce endogenous timing in a cascade model 
that predicts the least informed would trade later, and potentially face adverse prices.   
27 Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) test experimentally a version of the Avery and 
Zemsky (1998) model that omits event and composition uncertainty and find behavior fairly 






Figure 1: Counting Rule Heuristic -
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The proportion of Bayesian decisions for every realized posterior probability is presented as a 
data point. The choice histories in which the counting rule and Bayesian posterior yield 
different predictions are presented as dark squares. All other sequences are presented as black 
diamonds. Note that the sequences in which Bayesian behavior and the counting rule    
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heuristic make different predictions have a uniformly lower proportion of Bayesian decisions 
than the others. 
 
 
 
 
 